TCCA (General Procedure) s. 12(1)
Cases
The Queen v. Carew, 92 DTC 6608 (FCA)
The Crown served its reply to the taxpayer's notice of appeal on the 60th day required by Rule 44(1) but, due to an unexplained failure of the subordinate employee, the reply was not presented for filing until the following day. In finding that the Crown should be granted an extension, Hugessen J.A. stated (p. 6610):
"In the context of this litigation the addition of one day to the time of filing (but not even of service) of the reply is of no consequence."
[C.R: Rule 63]
TCCA (General Procedure) s. 63(2)
See Also
Foundation Instruments Inc. v. The Queen, 92 DTC 1879 (TCC)
Garron J. found that the appropriate sanction for the Crown filing its Reply three days late (due to an error in calculating the 60-day deadline) was that set out in s. 63(2)(b), given that the delay was minimal and no prejudice of any specific nature was established by the taxpayer.
Discovery Research Systems Inc. v. The Queen, 92 DTC 1306 (TCC)
[C.R: Rule 12(1)]
In denying an extension of the time for filing Replies of the Minister, Bonner J. stated (p. 1307):
"If extensions of the time for filing Replies were permitted in cases of delay caused by simple inadvertence there would be a swift return to the 'battle days' when, under the rules which governed proceedings commenced before 1991, the great majority of Replies were served and filed well after the sixty day deadline.
Carew v. The Queen, 92 DTC 1291 (TCC)
In refusing to grant an extension under s. 63(1) in respect of a one-day delay in filing a Reply due to administrative inefficiencies, Kempo J. stated that "to exercise that power with respect to that Rule in matters other than those of highly unusual, very exceptional or non-contemplated circumstances would, in my view, trivialize it".
Section 16
Cases
C.D. v. MNR, 91 DTC 5210 (FCA)
After referring (at p. 5211) to the principle "that the courts must administer justice in public", and noting that this principle is subject only to narrowly defined exceptions, Décary J.A. found that a taxpayer was not entitled to have an in camera hearing "for the sole purpose of hiding from a professional body a conduct which might lead to disciplinary proceedings" (p. 5213).
Section 17.2
See Also
Fio Corporation v. The Queen, 2014 TCC 58
On the same day, the taxpayer delivered its notice of appeal to the Tax Court, informed CRA of the appeal, and delivered its documents and list of documents. The Minister then used these documents to issue a second reassessment. The taxpayer successfully argued that this was a breach of the Minister's duty, as a litigant, to refrain from using discovery information outside of the relevant proceedings (see summary under s. 152(4)). As a preliminary matter, D'Arcy J found that:
- the taxpayer's appeal had been instituted immediately upon the Tax Court's receipt of the notice of appeal, rather than when the Court served the notice on the Minister nearly four weeks later (para. 36); and
- the documents were not disclosed voluntarily, but as part of the discovery process (and the taxpayer disclosed promptly in order to hurry the proceedings along) (para. 38).
Subsection 18(1)
Articles
Christie A.C.J., "Practice in the Tax Court of Canada", 1991 British Columbia Tax Conference, Volume 1
Subsection 18.15(4)
Cases
Muszka v. The Queen, 94 DTC 6076 (FCA)
A chartered accountant, who was the friend of the taxpayer and allegedly had intimate knowledge of the assessments in question and the business affairs of the taxpayer, appeared as agent for the taxpayer. It was improper of the Tax Court Judge to prohibit the agent from testifying given that such agent was not an officer of the court whose credibility must be accepted without qualification.
Section 18.24
Cases
The Queen v. Ray, 2004 DTC 6028, 2004 FCA 1
In rejecting a submission that deference should be given to the interpretation given by the Tax Court below in interpreting s. 118.2(2)(n) of the Income Tax Act, Sharlow J.A. stated (at p. 6031) that "decisions of the Tax Court and questions of law are to be reviewed on the standard of correctness, regardless of the procedure under which the decision was made".
Gastrebski v. The Queen, 94 DTC 6355 (FCA)
In finding that the standard for review by the Court of Appeal was the same for appeals from informal Tax Court decisions as for appeals from the formal procedure (i.e., a standard of correctness) Linden J.A. stated (pp. 6357):
"The legal issues involved in both situations of review are the same, the decision-making body being appealed from is the same and the supervising Court is the same ... . The legislation being interpreted in these cases is tax legislation, where consistency is particularly necessary."