Cases
Soper v. The Queen, 97 DTC 5407 (FCA)
Robertson J.A. applied the "'presumption of coherence in enactments of the same legislature'" to derive assistance in the interpretation of s. 227.1(3) of the Income Tax Act by referring to s. 122(1)(b) of the Canada Business Corporations Act.
Windrim v. The Queen, 91 DTC 5221 (FCTD)
Muldoon J. found that the provisions of the Expropriation Act and of the Income Tax Act dealing with an individual's residence were not in pari materia given their different purposes.
E.H. Price Ltd. v. The Queen, 83 DTC 5288, [1983] CTC 289 (FCA)
"Both counsel referred to a wide assortment of statutes that employ the phrase 'at any time' in a variety of contexts. Construing the phrase in the context of its use in other statutes is merely an exercise in the production of irrelevancies unless the project can be fairly said to come within the canon of construction known as in pari materia [which was not the case]."
In re Paroian, 80 DTC 6077, [1980] CTC 131 (Ont.C.A.)
It was suggested that since, at the time of drafting of s. 231(4) of the Act, s. 443(1) of the Criminal Code was available "as a ready model of search and seizure legislation, it is reasonable to think that S.231(4), having regard to its special subject matter, was not drawn to achieve the same effect as s. 443(1)," i.e., the differences in its wording from s. 443(1) were deliberate.
Roadburg v. The Queen in Right of British Columbia, [1980] 6 W.W.R. 385 (BCCA)
S.37 of the Corporation Capital Tax Act (B.C.) was interpreted in light of the context of similar or identical provisions appearing in the Logging Tax Act (B.C.), the Mining Tax Act (B.C.), the Mineral Resource Tax Act (B.C.), the Insurance Premiums Tax Act (B.C.), the Mineral Land Tax Act (B.C.), the Taxation Act (B.C.) and predecessor statutes. It accordingly was found that the word "imposed" in s. 37 had the meaning that it had in the comparable provisions of the other statutes.
Henderson Estate v. M.N.R, 73 DTC 5471, [1973] CTC 636 (FCTD), aff'd 75 D.TC 5332, [1975] C.TC 485 (FCA)
"The Income Tax Act and the Dominion Succession Duty Act are not strictly statutes in pari materia yet they both have the ultimate objective of imposing a tax based upon the fair market value of an asset. Therefore, in this instance, I can see no logical reason for ascribing other than a uniform meaning to the words 'fair market value' as used in the Dominion Succession Duty Act and as used in section 14(2) of the Income Tax Act."
Toronto General Trusts Corp. (Hilder Estate) v. MNR, 58 DTC 1162, [1958] CTC 223, [1958] S.C.R. 499
In commenting on the relevance of cases decided under the Finance Act, 1894 (U.K.) to the interpretation of the Dominion Succession Duty Act (Canada), Judson J. stated (p. 1168):
"The two Acts differ so widely in structure and incidence of taxation that cases decided under one Act are of little assistance to the interpretation of the other and it is of no help that sections of one Act may have been copied from the other. The Dominion Succession Duty Act must be construed independently and the caution expressed in Attorney-General for Ontario v. Perry, [1934] A.C. 477, [1934] 4 DLR 65, [1934] 3 W.W.R. 35, against a consideration of statutory origins and evolutions as an aid to interpretation is particularly appropriate here where the two Acts differ so fundamentally."
See Also
Otineka Development Corp. Ltd. v. The Queen, 94 DTC 1234 (TCC)
The Excise Tax Act was not a statute in pari materia with the Income Tax Act. Accordingly, the word "municipality" in s. 149(1)(d) of the Income Tax Act was not given the restrictive meaning accorded to it in a definition in the Excise Tax Act. Bowman TCJ. also stated that:
"it would be only in the rarest and most compelling of circumstances that I would import a restrictive definition of a word from one statute into another statute where that word was undefined" (p. 1239).